University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1918

Full Faith and Credit and Jurisdiction
Willard T. Barbour

University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/892

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, State and Local
Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Barbour, Willard T. "Full Faith and Credit and Jurisdiction." Mich. L. Rev. 17 (1918): 90-3.

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND JUISDICTION.-The judgment of a sister
state, when assailed by collateral attack, is often said to occupy a position intermediate between foreign and domestic judgments. Though the older
American cases were inclined to examine into the merits of any foreign judgment, the present tendency is toward the adoption of the English view according to which a foreign judgment may be attacked collaterally only for
want of jurisdiction or fraud. Dicey, Conflict of Laws (ed. 2) Ch. XVII;
see note to Trenblay v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 97 Me. 547, in 94 Am. St.
Rep. 521, 538. But whereas any statement of jurisdictional facts in a foreign
judgment is presumptive only, a domestic judgment is free from collateral
attack on the ground of jurisdiction, except where lack of jurisdiction appears upon the face of the record. I BLACK, JUDGMENTS (ed. 2), § 274. The
courts of New York have declined to accord this favoured position to domestic judgments and apparently make no distinction between domestic judgments and those of a sister state in this matter. Ferguson v. Crawford. 7o
N. Y. 253, 26 Am. Rep. 589. In view of the so-called 'full faith and credit
clause' of the constitution (Art. IV, §i), it is difficult to see why the judg-
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ment of a sister state should be open to any form of collateral attack to
which it is not open in the state where the judgment is rendered. This
would seem to follow from the familiar- statement of Chief Justice Marshall
in Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234 (affirming the doctrine of Mills v.
Duryee, 7 Cranch 481), which in the opinion of Justice Holmes is still a cor-.
rect exposition of the law. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 23o, 236-7.
At all events it is clear that the judgment of a sister state may not be attacked collaterally upon the merits, and accordingly it becomes important to
determine what matters are jurisdictional. Ordinarily the line of demarcation between the two is easily drawn, but when the judgment is rendered by
a court of general jurisdiction in pursuance of a statutory or constitutional
provision, the problem of delimiting jurisdiction becomes acute. Justice
Holmes in Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra, has stated this very neatly: "No doubt
it sometimes may be difficult to decide whether certain words in a statute
are directed to jurisdiction or to merits, but the distinction between the two
is plain. One goes to the power, the other only to the duty of the court. ** *
Whether a given statute is intended simply to establish a rule of substantive
law, and thus to define the duty of the court, or is meant to limit its power,
is a question of construction and common sense. When it affects a court of
general jurisdiction and deals with a matter upon which that court must
pass, we naturally are slow to read ambiguous words, as meaning to leave
the judgment open to dispute, or as intended to do more than fix the rule by
which the courts should decide." Any reasonable doubt, then, should be resolved in favour of jurisdiction, and it is encouraging to find that in the
most recent case in which this question has been presented to the Supreme
Court the majority of the justices took this view.
Under the law of Minnesota, if execution on a judgient against a domestic corporation is returned unsatisfied, the court at the suit of a judgment creditor may sequestrate the property and appoint a receiver for the
same. If in such suit the receiver presents a petition asserting that any constitutional or statutory liability of the stockholders exists and that resort
thereto is necessary, the court may upon proper hearing make an order
ratably assessing the stockholders on account of such liability and direct
that the assessment be paid to the receiver. The court's order is made "conclusive as to all matters relating to the amount, propriety and necessity of the
assessment" (Rev. Laws 1905, §§ 3173, 3184-3187), and if payment is not
made the duty devolves upon the receiver of enforcing the court's order
against defaulting stockholders wherever found. The order which produced
the present controversy was made by the Minnesota court in a sequestration
suit against the American Biscuit Company of Crookston, a Minnesota corporation. The receiver brought suit upon this order against a defaulting
stockholder in North Dakota. The defendant contended that under the
terms of the provision of the constitution of Minnesota (Art. X, § 3), which
imposed a liability upon stockholders of corporations "except those organized for the purpose of carrying on manufacturing or mechanical business",
the American Biscuit Company belonged to the class whose stockholders were
excepted from liability, and that hence the Minnesota court was without
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jurisdiction to make the order in question. This argument prevailed in North
Dakota (32 N. D. 536); upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States it was held (Justices Clarke, Pitney and Brandeis, dissenting), that
the court of North Dakota did not give to the proceeding in Minnesota the
full faith and credit to which it was entitled under the constitution and laws
of the United States. Marin v. Augedahl (I918), 38 Sup. Ct. 452.
This decision seems eminently sound. The Minnesota court, by the law
of its organization, was empowered to take cognizance of, hear and determine the sequestration suit and the receiver's petition for an assessment.
Clearly it had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit. Cooper v. Reynolds, io Wall. 308, 316. Whether or not the stockholder against whom the
order was sought to be enforced in North Dakota was personally a party to
the original suit in Minnesota does not appear, but it is a matter of no consequence. The rule in Minnesota, which is also the general rule, is that, as
a stockholder, he was sufficiently represented by the corporation to be bound
by the order so far as that order determined the character and insolvency of
the corporation and the propriety of the assessment. Hawkins v. Glenn,
131 U. S. 319; Bernheimer v. Converse, 2o6 U. S. 516. See also Royal Arcanuin v. Green, 237 U. S. 531. It follows that the Minnesota court had
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the person. The defendant, therefore,
was driven to the contention that Article X, § 3 (quoted supra) of the Constitution of Minnesota was directed to the jurisdiction of the court and not
to the merits of the decision. He was able to show by several Minnesota
cases; e. g., Hastings Malting Co. v. Iron Range Brewing Co., 65 Minn. 28
(manufacture and brewing of lager beer) ; Vencedor Investment Co. v. Highland C. and P. Co., 125 Minn. 2o (generating electricity), that the original
order in Minnesota was incorrect. If the brewing of beer or generating of
electricity entitles a corporation, as a manufacturing concern, to exemption
from the constitutional provision, it requires some hardihood to deny the
"manufacture" of biscuits. Such a finding was, of course, implicit in the
order. But if the order was erroneous, it should have been corrected by application to the court which made it, or by appeal. The constitutional proivison does not aim to deal directly with the jurisdiction of courts; rather
does it declare a general rule of liability for stockholders of corporations,
excepting therefrom corporations of a certain class. So far as mere words
go, the Statute of Frauds might seem to apply to jurisdiction; yet it is doubtful if any court ever regarded that statute as affecting aught save the merits.
Only by a strange distortion of language can the constitutional provision be
regarded as jurisdictional. The effort of Justice Clarke in his dissenting opinion to support such a proposition is far from convincing. He laid great stress
upon a number of Minnesota cases, of which Dwinnel v. Kramer, 87 Minn.
392, is typical. It was there held that a policy holder in an insolvent mutual
insurance company, against whom a general assessment on the policy holders
was sought to be enforced, might successfully defend upon the ground that
his policy was an "ordinary contract of insurance" issued on receipt of a cash
premium and did not conform to the general plan. In other words he was
allowed to put forward a personal defense. So too an alleged stockholder
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might show that in fact he was not a stockholder or that he had paid the
assessment. Such decisions do not call in question the jurisdiction of the
court Which ordered the assessment. They do not involve the problem of
the principal case.
The effect of this decision appears to be that the judgment of a state
court is conclusive throughout the Union as to all questions upon which it
would be conclusive in the state where it is rendered. It affords consequently
an interesting commentary upon a common interpretation put upon two
much discussed cases: Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, and National
Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257.
W. T. B.

